We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies world-wide. We show that if we allow agents to vote for any method within a rich domain of piece-wise linear methods, then a majority voting equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if most voters have income below mean income then each method within the domain can be supported in equilibrium.
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The primary struggle among citizens in all advanced democracies is over the distribution of economic resources. Income taxation, besides being a major source of state funds, is one of the essential tools for solving such a struggle, which makes it a matter of concern for politicians and economists alike. The search for the perfect income tax structure is (and has been for a long time) a milestone and even though some consensus has been reached (e.g., almost all countries in the world use statutory tax schedules specified only in terms of the brackets and tax rates) the discussion is far from being over. 1 In this paper, we approach this issue from a political economy perspective, upon studying the political process in which tax methods are either chosen directly by voters, according to majority rule, or via elections in a perfectly representative democracy.
Academic interest in this area started to emerge after Foley (1967) , who analyzed the problem of voting over taxes in an endowment economy. Foley focused on the case of flat taxes (with or without exemption; and allowing or excluding for the existence of negative taxes) and showed that, for such a class, there always exists a majority voting equilibrium, i.e., a (flat) tax method that cannot be overturned by any other member of the class through majority rule. 2 In this paper, we plan to focus on the class of piece-wise linear tax methods (rather than flat taxes) which, as mentioned above, seems to be almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. For such a class, however, Foley's result does not extend and a majority voting equilibrium fails to exist. In other words, any piece-wise linear tax method can be overturned by another piece-wise linear tax method through majority rule. This is actually not more than another instance of Condorcet's paradox of voting, which is perhaps best exemplified by the problem of determining the division of a cake by majority rule (or, equivalently, tax shares by majority 1 rule from a given initial distribution of endowments). 3 Such a result might lead one to despair of ever achieving a voting equilibrium for any democratic polity. Nevertheless, as Campbell (1975) puts it, majority voting is never allowed to operate by itself without restraints imposed by constitution and convention. We actually show that if we limit the class of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not very restrictive, the existence of a majority voting equilibrium is guaranteed. As a matter of fact, under a mild assumption, we construct the precise equilibrium for any parameter configuration of the model and show an interesting feature of it: any tax method within the class can be a majority voting equilibrium, provided the predetermined level of aggregate fiscal revenue is properly chosen.
The class of admissible methods we consider emerges as a generalization of a method inspired by the Babylonian Talmud (e.g., O'Neill, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985) . The principle underlying behind these methods is to impose each taxpayer a burden of the same sort as that faced by the whole society. Namely, if the overall tax burden is below a certain fraction of the aggregate income, then no taxpayer can pay more than such a fraction of her gross income. Similarly, if the burden is above a certain fraction of the aggregate income, then no taxpayer can pay less than such a fraction of her gross income. The class encompasses a whole non-countable set of methods ranging from the "least" progressive (the needs-blind head tax) to the "most" progressive (the incentives-blind leveling tax) piece-wise linear tax methods. Thus, voters are confronted with a wide variety of choices to select the best tax method, even if we restrict their options to this class. 4 As we shall see later in the text, our modeling choice for this work is somehow unconventional. More precisely, most of the contributions in this area assume the existence of a continuum (rather than a finite set) of taxpayers. The main reason for it is twofold. On the one hand, the aim of modeling large (rather than small) elections. On the other hand, to allow for the use of calculus and hence avoid some theoretical problems, such as those resulting from the non-convexity of the individual voting choice set, or from the fact that a change of a vote might make a discrete change in policy (e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal, 1996) . Nevertheless, we find some of those problems interesting and hence believe that they should not be dismissed from the outset. That is the main reason why we opt in this paper for a discrete modeling assumption. Another important reason to do so is the intention to explore the existence of equilibrium in smaller elections, when the tax problem refers to collecting a given amount of revenue out of a small (and hence finite) community. This is also the spirit in part of the literature to which this paper relates too. A notable instance is Young (1988) , which although not concerned with the political economy of income taxation, could be considered as the seminal paper to analyze the principle of equal sacrifice, and its connections with distributive justice (a recurrent theme of this paper), in taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. In Section 3, we provide our main result regarding the existence of majority voting equilibrium for a large set of piece-wise linear tax methods. In Section 4, we explicitly construct the equilibrium under an additional condition. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The model
We study taxation problems in a variable population model, first introduced by Young (1988) . 5 The set of potential taxpayers, or agents, is identified by the set of natural numbers N. Let N be the set of finite subsets of N, with generic element N . For each i ∈ N , let y i ∈ R + be i's (taxable) income and y ≡ (y i ) i∈N the income profile. A (taxation) problem is a triple consisting of a population N ∈ N, an income profile y ∈ R N + , and a tax revenue
To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume Y = i∈N y i > 0. Let D N be the set of taxation problems with population N and D ≡ ∪ N ∈N D N . Given a problem (N, y, T ) ∈ D, a tax profile is a vector x ∈ R N satisfying the following three conditions: (i) for each i ∈ N , 0 ≤ x i ≤ y i , (ii) i∈N x i = T and (iii) for each i, j ∈ N , y i ≥ y j implies x i ≥ x j and y i − x i ≥ y j − x j . We refer to (i) as boundedness, (ii) as balancedness and (iii) as order preservation. A (taxation) method on D, R : D → ∪ N ∈N R N , associates with each problem (N, y, T ) ∈ D a tax profile R (N, y, T ) for the problem. 6 5 O'Neill (1982) used earlier the same mathematical framework to analyze the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. Readers are referred to Moulin (2002) or Thomson (2003) for extensive treatments of diverse problems (such as taxation, conflicting claims, bankruptcy, cost sharing, or surplus sharing) fitting this framework. 6 In essence, the problem under consideration is a distribution problem, in which the total amount to be distributed is exogenous, and the issue is to determine methods providing an allocation for each admissible problem. There is another branch of the taxation Instances of methods are the head tax, which distributes the tax burden equally, provided no agent ends up paying more than her income, the leveling tax, which equalizes post-tax income across agents, provided no agent is subsidized and the flat tax, which equalizes tax rates across agents.
All these methods are instances of piece-wise linear tax methods. Formally, a piece-wise linear tax method is a method associated to a vector of brackets, rates and lump-sum levies. For each bracket, a given tax rate is proposed and the corresponding lump-sum levies of the brackets are designed so that the schedule moves continuously from one bracket to another. More precisely, a method R is piece-wise linear if for each (N, y, T ) ∈ D there exist sequences {α j , β j , λ j } k j=1 such that (i) For each j = 1, . . . , k, α j , λ j ∈ R + and β j ∈ R;
(ii) For each j = 1, . . . , k − 1, λ j ≤ λ j+1 ;
(iii) For each j = 1, . . . , k, 0 ≤ α j ≤ 1.
and, for each i ∈ N ,
where j is such that λ j−1 ≤ y i ≤ λ j . Note that item (iii) above guarantees that every tax schedule has slope less than one. Item (iv) guarantees that the path of taxes generated by the method is continuous. Finally, item (v) guarantees that the tax payed by each agent is neither negative nor higher than her pre-tax income. 7 literature in which no reference to the amount of revenue to be raised is made (e.g., Mitra and Ok, 1997) . In such a branch, the basic problem is to determine a tax function yielding the tax associated to each positive income level. An underlying assumption of the corresponding models is to assume the existence of a non-countable set of agents (a reasonable assumption only in the case of arbitrary large populations), which, as mentioned above, allows the use of calculus. A more general approach encompassing both possibilities is taken by Le Breton et al., (1996) . 7 Alternatively, if we do not impose item (v) in the parameter configuration of the method R, we shall impose that for each i ∈ N ,
where j is such that λj−1 ≤ yi ≤ λj, and will also deem the resulting method to be a piece-wise linear method.
We will analyze the problem in which agents vote for tax methods according to majority rule. We assume that voters are self-interested: given a pair of alternatives, a taxpayer votes for the alternative that gives her the greatest post-tax income. We say that a method R is a majority voting equilibrium for a set of methods S if, for any (N, y, T ) ∈ D, there is no other method R ∈ S such that, y − R (N, y, T ) > y − R (N, y, T ) for the majority of voters.
The existence of equilibrium
We start this section with a (non-surprising) negative result.
Theorem 1 There is no majority voting equilibrium for the family of piecewise linear tax methods.
Even though the technical proof of this result might be cumbersome, its logic should be clear. It all amounts to realize that given a piece-wise linear tax method, one can construct another (piece-wise linear) method increasing taxes for a small group of taxpayers and reducing the burden for all the others, while keeping the tax revenue constant. The argument, which is even valid for two-piece linear methods, is similar to others used in related models (e.g., Hamada, 1973 ; Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortín, 1998).
A caveat is worth mentioning. If more than half of the agents are paying zero taxes, we cannot reduce their burdens and thus the corresponding tax allocation could not be defeated through majority rule by any other allocation. Nevertheless, there is no method guaranteeing that more than half of the agents are paying zero taxes for any admissible problem (although there certainly exist methods doing so for specific problems). The most extreme case would be the leveling tax, which would always be the most preferred method by the agent with the lowest income. This method, however, can be defeated by other piece-wise linear methods in many problems (in which, needless to say, there is not a majority of the population facing a zero tax burden with the leveling tax).
Given the previous result, our aim now shifts to prove the existence of a majority voting equilibrium for a sufficiently large family of piece-wise linear tax methods. To do so, we start considering a (piece-wise linear) method inspired by the Babylonian Talmud, implementing an old principle of distributive justice by which each taxpayer should face a burden of the same sort as that faced by the whole society. More precisely, if the overall tax burden is below one half of the aggregate income (which could be considered as a psychological threshold), then no taxpayer can pay more than such a fraction of her gross income. Similarly, if the burden is above one half of the aggregate income, then no taxpayer can pay less than such a fraction of her gross income. Formally, For all (N, y, T ) ∈ D, and all i ∈ N ,
where λ > 0 and µ > 0 are chosen so that i∈N R i (N, y, T ) = T . In the usual parlance of taxation, the "Talmud method" yields two possible types of tax schedules. If the aim is to collect a tax revenue below one half of the aggregate income, the tax rate is one half up to some income level (which is endogenously determined), and zero afterwards. If, on the contrary, the tax revenue is above one half of the aggregate income, the tax rate is one half first and then one. Thus, even though it is a well-justified method on normative grounds (e.g., Moulin, 2002; Thomson, 2003) , it seems to be quite specific for real-life taxation purposes.
One way of generalizing the Talmud method would be by moving the threshold (and the tax rate) in the above definition from one half to any other possible fraction (of the aggregate and individual incomes). In doing so, we would obtain a non-countable set of piece-wise linear methods ranging from the leveling tax to the head tax (and having the Talmud method in the middle). 8 Those tax methods would also yield two possible types of tax schedules that could be described similarly to those originating from the Talmud method. More precisely, for tax revenues below a fraction θ of the aggregate income, the tax rate would be θ up to some income level, and zero afterwards. For tax revenues above such fraction, the tax rate would be θ first and then one. 9 In order to accommodate less restrictive methods too, while preserving the principle behind the Talmud method, we allow for other minimum and maximum tax rates, instead of always imposing zero and one for those values. More precisely, we consider tax methods yielding two possible types of tax schedules; namely, for tax revenues below a fraction θ of the aggregate income, the tax rate would be θ up to some income level, and θ min after-wards. For tax revenues above such fraction, the tax rate would be θ first and then θ max . Formally, we have the next definition.
Let θ min , θ max ∈ [0, 1] be fixed and such that θ min < θ max . For each θ ∈ [θ min , θ max ], we define the method R θ as follows. For all (N, y, T ) ∈ D, and all i ∈ N ,
where λ and µ are chosen so that
In order to illustrate further the above definition, we describe the algorithm by which tax burdens are allocated according to the (generalized talmudic) method R θ , as the revenue varies from zero to the aggregate income of a given group of taxpayers. More precisely, let y be a given (gross) tax profile such that y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ · · · ≤ y n and imagine that the tax revenue T moves from 0 to the aggregate income Y = n i=1 y i . For T sufficiently small, the revenue is only financed by n (the taxpayer with the highest income). As T increases, the remaining taxpayers are sequentially asked to pay taxes (once they are able to do so) at the tax rate θ min . This continues until all taxpayers contribute a θ min fraction of their income. As T increases from that point, equal taxation (for the increment) prevails until 1 (the taxpayer with the lowest income) pays a fraction θ of her income. At that point, 1 stops contributing while equal contribution of each (revenue) increment prevails among the other taxpayers. This process continues (making the remaining taxpayers stop contributing, sequentially, once they contribute a θ fraction of their income) until T = θY . The next increments of T are faced by n until n − 1 (the taxpayer with the second highest income) can contribute at the rate θ max , at which point she is invited to do so. As T increases from there, the remaining taxpayers are also asked sequentially (but now in the reverse ordering of incomes) to contribute at the rate θ max . Once all agents are contributing at the rate θ max then equal taxation (for the increment) prevails until 1 contributes with her whole income. From there, equal taxation (for the increment) prevails for the remaining agents, with the proviso that taxpayers contributing their whole income (obviously) stop paying additional increments.
It turns out, as the next result shows, that the family of generalized talmudic methods described above constitutes a rich domain of piece-wise linear tax methods for which majority voting equilibrium exists.
Theorem 2 There is a majority voting equilibrium for the family of generalized talmudic tax methods.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need the following lemma, which is interesting on its own, and whose proof appears in the appendix.
If n denotes the agent in N with the highest income then R θ 1 n (N, y, T ) ≥ R θ 2 n (N, y, T ).
We also need to introduce the following concept:
A method R single-crosses R if for each (N, y, T ) ∈ D, there exists i ∈ N such that one of the following statements holds:
The single-crossing property allows one to separate those agents who benefit from the application of one method or the other, depending on the rank of their incomes. It is well known that a sufficient condition for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium is that voters exhibit intermediate preferences over the set of alternatives (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996) . Thus, as we assume that voters are self-interested and therefore simply vote according to the post-tax incomes that methods offer to them, it suffices to show that, for any pair of values θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ [θ min , θ max ], R θ 1 single-crosses R θ 2 . To do so, let 0 ≤ θ min ≤ θ 1 ≤ θ 2 ≤ θ max ≤ 1, with θ min < θ max , and (N, y, T ) ∈ D be given. For ease of exposition, assume that N = {1, . . . , n} and y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ · · · ≤ y n . Then, it is enough to show that there exists some i * ∈ N such that:
We distinguish five cases:
In this case, the single-crossing property trivially follows as
In this case, by the definition of the family of generalized talmudic methods, R θ j i (N, y, T ) = min{θ j y i , θ min y i + λ j }, for all i ∈ N and j = 1, 2, where λ 1 and λ 2 are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r 1 be the smallest non-negative integer in {0, ..., n} such that T ≤ θ 1 ( r 1 i=1 y i ) + (n − r 1 )(θ 1 − θ min )y r 1 +1 and r 2 the smallest non-negative integer in {0, ..., n} such that
. It is straightforward to show that r 2 ≤ r 1 . Thus, R θ 1 (N, y, T ) = (θ 1 y 1 , ..., θ 1 y r 2 , ..., θ 1 y r 1 , θ min y r 1 +1 + λ 1 , ..., θ min y n + λ 1 ), and R θ 2 (N, y, T ) = (θ 2 y 1 , ..., θ 2 y r 2 , θ min y r 2 +1 + λ 2 , ..., θ min y r 1 +1 + λ 2 , ..., θ min y n + λ 2 ),
.., n. To conclude the proof of this case, we distinguish three subcases: Subcase 2.1: λ 2 + θ min y r 2 +1 < θ 1 y r 2 +1 . Then, i * = r 2 + 1 and the single-crossing property holds. Subcase 2.2: λ 2 + θ min y r 1 ≥ θ 1 y r 1 . Then, i * = r 1 + 1 and the single-crossing property holds. Subcase 2.3:
Then, there exists some k ∈ {r 2 +1, ..., r 1 −1} such that (θ 1 −θ min )y k+1 > λ 2 ≥ (θ 1 − θ min )y k . Thus, i * = k + 1 and the single-crossing property holds.
By the definition of the family of generalized talmudic methods, R θ 1 i (N, y, T ) = max{θ 1 y i , θ max y i −µ} and R θ 2 i (N, y, T ) = min{θ 2 y i , θ min y i +λ} for all i ∈ N , where µ and λ are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r 1 be the smallest non-negative integer in {0, ..., n − 1} such that T ≥ θ 1 Y + (θ max − θ 1 )(( n i=r 1 +1 y i ) − (n − r 1 )y r 1 +1 ). Furthermore, let r 2 be the smallest nonnegative integer in {0, ..., n − 1} such that T ≤ θ 2 ( r 2 i=1 y i ) + (n − r 2 )(θ 2 − θ min )y r 2 +1 . It is straightforward to show that r 2 ≤ r 1 . Thus, R θ 1 (N, y, T ) = (θ 1 y 1 , ..., θ 1 y r 1 , θ max y r 1 +1 − µ, ..., θ max y n − µ), and R θ 2 (N, y, T ) = (θ 2 y 1 , ..., θ 2 y r 2 , θ min y r 2 +1 + λ, ..., θ min y n + λ),
To conclude the proof of this case, we distinguish two subcases: we know that λ ≤ (θ 2 − θ min )y r 2 +1 . As θ 2 y r 2 +1 ≤ θ max y r 2 +1 − µ, it follows that λ + θ min y r 2 +1 ≤ θ max y r 2 +1 − µ or, equivalently, that λ + µ ≤ (θ max − θ min )y r 2 +1 ≤ (θ max − θ min )y k , for all k = r 2 +1, ..., n. As a result, R θ 1 k (N, y, T ) ≥ R θ 2 k (N, y, T ) for all k = k, ..., n and the single-crossing property follows.
Case 4: θ 2 Y ≤ T < θ max (Y − ny 1 ) + ny 1 . In this case, by the definition of the family of generalized talmudic methods, R θ j i (N, y, T ) = max{θ j y i , θ max y i −µ j }, for all i ∈ N and j = 1, 2, where µ 1 and µ 2 are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r 1 be the smallest nonnegative integer in {0, ..., n} such that
10 is straightforward to show that r 2 ≤ r 1 . Thus, R θ 1 (N, y, T ) = (θ 1 y 1 , ..., θ 1 y r 2 , ..., θ 1 y r 1 , θ max y r 1 +1 − µ 1 , ..., θ max y n − µ 1 ), and Then, i * = r 2 and the single-crossing property holds.
Then, there exists some k ∈ {r 2 +1, ..., r 1 −1} such that (θ max −θ 1 )y k+1 > µ 2 ≥ (θ max − θ 1 )y k . Thus, i * = k + 1 and the single-crossing property holds.
Case 5: T ≥ θ max (Y − ny 1 ) + ny 1 .
It is worth mentioning that the above proof of Theorem 2 does not extend to the whole domain of two-piece linear methods. To see this, take the Talmud method (T ), and the method R 
Further insights
The proof of Theorem 2 tells us that the majority voting equilibrium for the family of generalized talmudic tax methods is precisely the method preferred by the median voter, i.e., the median taxpayer. We now explore further the properties of the equilibrium whose existence has been shown in the previous section. In what follows, we make the following mild assumption, which reflects a well-established empirical fact in advanced democracies.
Assumption 0. In each taxation problem, the median income is below the mean income.
Our next result summarizes the main findings within this section. To ease the exposition of its statement, we assume, without loss of generality, that for each (N, y, T ) ∈ D, N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 3 odd, and y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ · · · ≤ y n . Let m = n+1 2 denote the median taxpayer of this problem. Furthermore, let Y m = n j=m y j − (n − m + 1)y m , and
Theorem 3 If Assumption 0 holds, and θ min Y ≤ T ≤ θ max Y , then R θ * is the majority voting equilibrium for the family of generalized talmudic tax methods
Proof. We start with a piece of notation. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D be given in the conditions described at the statement and let k ∈ N . Let us also consider the following thresholds:
As θ min Y ≤ T ≤ θ max Y , it is straightforward to show that θ k 1 ≤ θ k 2 ≤ θ k 3 ≤ θ k 4 , and that θ k 2 ≤ θ max and θ k 3 ≥ θ min . It can actually be shown, after some algebraic computations, that
where f k (·) and g k (·) are piece-wise linear decreasing functions. 12 A graphical illustration appears in Figure 1 .
Let k now be the median agent, i.e., k = m. Then, by Assumption 0, it follows that θ max y k + T −θmaxY n ≤ θ min y k + T −θ min Y n . As θ k 3 ≥ θ min and 12 Note that θ 1 1 = θ 1 2 and θ 1 3 = θ 1 4 , whereas θ n 2 = θ n 3 . Thus, the taxpayers with the lowest and highest incomes only have three pieces (two of them constant with respect to θ) in their preferences. θ k 2 ≤ θ max , there would be nine possible cases depending of the relative positions of the remaining θ k -thresholds with respect to θ min and θ max . For our purposes, and thanks to (1), they summarize in just two supra-cases. If θ k 2 < θ min then the minimum of R θ k (N, y, T ) , and therefore the most preferred method by agent k, is achieved for θ = θ min . If, otherwise, θ k 2 ≥ θ min , then the minimum of R θ k (N, y, T ) , and therefore the most preferred method by agent k, is achieved for θ = θ m 2 . This concludes the proof. It is straightforward to show that if T = θ max Y then θ * = θ max . Thus, the range of θ * is the whole interval [θ min , θ max ] and, hence, we have the next corollary.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 0, any method within the family of generalized talmudic tax methods {R θ } θ∈[θ min ,θmax] can be the majority voting equilibrium for this family, for a given predetermined level of aggregate fis-
Theorem 3 provides, under a mild assumption, an explicit expression for the majority voting equilibrium within the family of generalized talmudic tax methods, whose existence was shown in Theorem 2, as a function of the data of the tax problem (namely, the group of taxpayers and the predetermined level of aggregate fiscal revenue). Corollary 1 goes further and shows that, for a given group of taxpayers, and a given method within the family, there exists a predetermined level of aggregate fiscal revenue for which such a method is the equilibrium. Thus, if there is freedom to determine the level of aggregate fiscal revenue to be raised, a given method can be targeted to become the majority voting equilibrium. Another way of reading this corollary is as a neutrality condition for the family of generalized talmudic tax methods. In other words, the corollary is saying that there is no bias in favor, or against, any of the methods within the family as any of them can arise as an equilibrium.
Concluding remarks
We have dealt in this paper with the issue of designing the most appropriate income tax. There is a broad consensus worldwide about implementing piece-wise linear tax methods and therefore we have endorsed such a restriction in our (simple) modeling. A key aspect regarding the implementation of a piece-wise linear tax method is the choice of the corresponding brackets, rates and lump-sum levies. Here we have analyzed such aspect assuming that the tax parameters are chosen directly by voters according to majority rule. In spite of the impossibility result saying that if we allow agents to vote freely for any piece-wise linear tax method, no equilibrium can come out of it, we have obtained two positive results. First, we show that if we restrict the universe in a meaningful way an equilibrium does exist. Second, we show that, within such a restricted domain, basically any method can be the majority voting equilibrium, upon selecting precisely the level of aggregate fiscal revenue.
Our results also hold for the case of a perfectly representative democracy in which tax methods arise as a result of political competition. 14 More precisely, assume that there are two parties running in an election and that competition occurs only over tax policies. Given a pair of alternative policies, a taxpayer votes for the one she prefers (i.e., the one that gives her the greatest post-tax income). If she is indifferent, she votes for each policy with probability one-half. A political equilibrium would then be defined as a Nash equilibrium of the resulting game played by the two parties, where they share a common policy space, and in which their payoff functions are their probabilities of victory (that obviously depend on their policy choices). Under these conventions, one could easily mimic the results of this paper replacing the concept of majority rule equilibrium by that of political equilibrium and obtaining that both parties cater to the median voter.
The restriction to piece-wise linear tax methods has not been our only assumption in the model. We have also assumed the existence of a finite set of taxpayers, in contrast to most of the related literature, where it seems customary to deal with taxes in a calculus framework. We have actually eschewed any reference to tax functions and presented our proofs for pre-tax and post-tax vectors. It turns out that simple inequalities, dispensing with any differentiability assumption, have shown to be powerful enough (and mathematically elegant) to prove our results. Our modeling choice has also allowed us to analyze interesting features that are normally bypassed in this area (such as the effect that a change of a vote might have over policies, or, more generally, the behavior of voters in small elections) because of dealing with a calculus framework.
We have also imposed a constraint on the tax structure indicating that there is a predetermined level of aggregate fiscal revenue that has to be raised. This is a standard feature of both optimal tax models and voting models (e.g., Romer, 1975) . On the other hand, we have assumed that labor is perfectly inelastically supplied. Nevertheless, such assumption could be easily relaxed. In a more general model in which agents would have preferences over consumption and leisure, the preferred tax schedule of the median voter would also be the majority voting equilibrium, provided both preferences and tax schedules satisfy the single-crossing property (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996) . Minor restrictions (e.g., assuming both consumption and leisure are normal goods) would suffice to guarantee that preferences are single-crossing, and hence our results would still be relevant in this context.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that our result regarding the existence of majority voting equilibrium offers as a byproduct an implication over the distributive power of the methods within the domain being considered. More precisely, and as a consequence of the single-crossing property they exhibit, it also holds that the methods within the domain are completely ranked according to the so-called Lorenz dominance criterion, the most fundamental criterion of income inequality. 15 
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
In this case, the statement trivially follows as R θ 1 (N, y, T ) ≡ R θ 2 (N, y, T ).
. It is straightforward to show that r 2 ≤ r 1 . Thus, R θ 1 (N, y, T ) = (θ 1 y 1 , ..., θ 1 y r 2 , ..., θ 1 y r 1 , θ min y r 1 +1 + λ 1 , ..., θ min y n + λ 1 ), and R θ 2 (N, y, T ) = (θ 2 y 1 , ..., θ 2 y r 2 , θ min y r 2 +1 + λ 2 , ..., θ min y r 1 +1 + λ 2 , ..., θ min y n + λ 2 ), 
which represents a contradiction.
By the definition of the family of generalized talmudic methods, R θ 1 i (N, y, T ) = max{θ 1 y i , θ max y i −µ} and R θ 2 i (N, y, T ) = min{θ 2 y i , θ min y i +λ} for all i ∈ N , where µ and λ are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r 1 be the smallest non-negative integer in {0, ..., n − 1} such that T ≥ θ 1 Y + (θ max − θ 1 )(( n i=r 1 +1 y i ) − (n − r 1 )y r 1 +1 ). Furthermore, let r 2 be the smallest nonnegative integer in {0, ..., n − 1} such that T ≤ θ 2 ( r 2 i=1 y i ) + (n − r 2 )(θ 2 − θ min )y r 2 +1 . It is straightforward to show that r 2 ≤ r 1 . Thus, R θ 1 (N, y, T ) = (θ 1 y 1 , ..., θ 1 y r 1 , θ max y r 1 +1 − µ, ..., θ max y n − µ), and R θ 2 (N, y, T ) = (θ 2 y 1 , ..., θ 2 y r 2 , θ min y r 2 +1 + λ, ..., θ min y n + λ), . Consequently, R θ 1 i (N, y, T ) ≤ R θ 2 i (N, y, T ) for all i = 1, ..., min{r 1 , r 2 }. Assume, by contradiction, that R θ 1 n (N, y, T ) < R θ 2 n (N, y, T ), i.e., (θ max − θ min )y n < µ + λ. It follows from here that (θ max − θ min )y k < µ + λ for all k ∈ N . Thus, R θ 1 i (N, y, T ) < R θ 2 i (N, y, T ) for all i = max{r 1 , r 2 }, ..., n. Finally, let k ∈ {min{r 1 , r 2 } + 1, ..., max{r 1 , r 2 } − 1}.
If r 1 < r 2 then R θ 1 k (N, y, T ) = θ max y k −µ ≥ θ 1 y k whereas R θ 2 k (N, y, T ) = θ 2 y k ≤ θ min y k + λ. Thus, We have therefore shown that, in any case, R θ 1 k (N, y, T ) < R θ 2 k (N, y, T ) for all k ∈ {min{r 1 , r 2 } + 1, ..., max{r 1 , r 2 } − 1}. Thus,
which represents a contradiction. Case 4: θ 2 Y ≤ T < θ max (Y − ny 1 ) + ny 1 . In this case, by the definition of the family of generalized talmudic methods, R θ j i (N, y, T ) = max{θ j y i , θ max y i −µ j }, for all i ∈ N and j = 1, 2, where µ 1 and µ 2 are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r 1 be the smallest nonnegative integer in {0, ..., n} such that T ≥ θ 1 Y + (θ max − θ 1 )(( n i=r 1 +1 y i ) − (n − r 1 )y r 1 +1 ). Furthermore, let r 2 be the smallest non-negative integer in {0, ..., n} such that T ≥ θ 2 Y + (θ max − θ 2 )(( n i=r 2 +1 y i ) − (n − r 2 )y r 2 +1 ). It is straightforward to show that r 2 ≤ r 1 . Thus, R θ 1 (N, y, T ) = (θ 1 y 1 , ..., θ 1 y r 2 , ..., θ 1 y r 1 , θ max y r 1 +1 − µ 1 , ..., θ max y n − µ 1 ), R θ 2 (N, y, T ) = (θ 2 y 1 , ..., θ 2 y r 2 , θ max y r 2 +1 − µ 2 , ..., θ max y n − µ 2 ), where µ 1 = 
